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Developing countries generally show some kind of dualism in their labor markets, be it 
with respect to production structure (traditional or modern), to geographical location (rural or 
urban), to legal nature of the activities (formal or underground), or to the composition of the 
labor force (skilled or non-skilled). As shown by Agénor and Montiel (1996, p. 63), duality in 
the labor market implies a segmentation, i.e., a situation in which identical workers earn 
different wages depending on where they are employed.  
Todaro (1969) has built up a seminal model to analyze rural-urban migration in a 
developing country, extending and formalizing ideas from various authors that followed 
Lewis (1954). As the main assumption of the model, the decision of the rural worker to 
migrate depends upon expected differential wage. In Michael Todaro's analysis, the decision 
to move is seen as an investment decision tied to expected net returns. These expected returns 
crucially depend upon the probability of getting a job at the traditional urban sector, also 
called underground or informal, versus a job in the modern, or formal, sector. The model 
takes this probability as endogenous and influenced by the creation of urban employment and 
the number of unemployed urban workers. The objective of the model is to show how the 
employment rate tends to an equilibrium below full employment even in the long run. Harris 
and Todaro (1970) is a general equilibrium analysis in which the artificial upholding of the 
wage differential between the rural and urban sectors leads to an inefficient equilibrium. 
Although the informal sector is now excluded from the model, the concept of expected wage 
is kept. What determines the expected wage is employment or unemployment in the urban 
sector. 
Despite defending the principle that workers take into consideration the present value of 
the expected real income flow, Todaro (1969) as well as Harris and Todaro (1970) in fact 
work with the postulate of myopic expectations. Todaro (1969, sect. IV) formally obtains his 
main conclusions from the assumption that the time horizon of the workers is only one period. 
Thus, in their model, the differential in real income for time t  appears in place of the 
differential of the present value of the flow of expected real income along two or more 
periods. This is done in the adjustment mechanism associated with the aggregate supply of 
workers to the urban sector. Todaro (1969, p. 143, n. 10) justifies this by saying that this "... 
assumption is made necessary by mathematical convenience but is in fact probably a more 
realistic formulation in terms of actual decision making in less developed nations ..." [Our 
italics.] We consider this implicit idea of bounded rationality of the workers, and propose a 
model based on the tools of the theory of evolutionary games.
1  
In our model, the migratory movement of workers is interpreted as a process of 
imitation/learning in an environment of bounded rationality.
2 With the help of an evolutionary 
game, we deduce a replicator dynamics that replaces the adjustment mechanism postulated 
both in Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970). Starting with their same general 
equilibrium structure, but including it in our model of evolutionary game, we show that their 
classical results appear as a consequence of the interaction among economic agents that try to 
get higher wages in a context of bounded rationality. 
 
                                                 
1 On this theory, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), Mailath (1992), Weibull (1995), Vega-Redondo (1996), and 
Samuelson (1997). 
2 The model is based on one initially presented in ... (2001), where it was used to represent the competition 
among workers along business cycles. 
 12. The Harris-Todaro analysis of the rural-urban migratory movement 
 
Harris and Todaro (1970) study the migration of workers in a two-sector economic 
system, called rural and urban. These sectors differ by the kind of goods they produce and by 
the technology of production. The rural sector specializes in the production of an agricultural 
good whose productive process is described by the following production function:
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   ,   with   and   ) ( a a n g x = 0 ) ( > ′ a n g 0 ) ( < ′ ′ a n g ,                      (1) 
in which   is the production level of the agricultural good and n  is the input quantity of 
workers (in units of population) to the rural sector. The endowment of land and the stock of 
capital of this sector are given for the period of analysis. 
a x a
Similarly, the urban sector has the following production function: 
   ,   with  ) ( m m n f x = 0 ) ( > ′ m n f  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ m n f ,            (2) 
where   is the production level of the manufactured good and n  is the quantity of workers 
(in units of population) used in the production of manufactured goods. The stock of capital of 
this sector is also given during the period of analysis. 
m x m
Both goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive. However, there is segmentation 
in the labor market. For the rural sector, the real wage, perfectly flexible, is equal to the 
marginal productivity of labor: 
    g a p na) ( ′ = ω ,                              (3) 
where  a ω  is the real wage and p is the price of the agricultural good, both expressed in terms 
of the manufactured good.
4  
 For the urban sector, besides perfectly competitive markets, it is assumed a minimum 
wage,  m ω , fixed at a level above equilibrium in this labor market. Formally: 
   ) (
*
m m n f ′ = ω  such that   ,                          (4)  u m n n ≤
*
where   is the quantity of workers (in population units) in the urban sector.  u n
 As to the terms of trade between the two sectors, it is assumed that the relative price 
varies according to the relative scarcity between them, i.e., 
   ) ( a m x x p ρ = , with  0 ) ( > ′ a m x x ρ .              (5) 
Within the period of analysis, the total population of workers in economy is given at a 
level  0 > n . Without loss of generality, we may normalize the population size to  1 = n .  Since 
by assumption there are only two sectors and rural prices are wholly flexible,
5 then at any 
time the following equalities are verified: 
                                                 
3 Our notation is slightly different from the original one of Harris and Todaro (1970). We work, without loss of 
generality, with the number of workers normalized in units of total population, since this is the adequate variable 
for the evolutionary game that we will develop in the next section.  
4 Thus the manufactured good is taken as the numeraire.  
5 This means that there is full employment in the rural area. 
 2   1 = + u a n n .                                (6) 
With these assumptions, there is a general equilibrium structure that determines, for a 
given urban population of workers, a relative price structure,  ) , ( p a ω , a sector allocation of 
labor,  , and the sector production,  . The urban sector minimum wage being 
fixed at 
) , ( m a n n ) , ( m a x x
m ω , the firms of this sector, as price takers, maximize profits by employing   and 




m x m ω , by (4) we get n ; then we get   with the help of  
(2). Therefore, during the period of analysis, given the minimum wage, the employment level 





Once the distribution of workers between the sectors of the economy is given, the real 
wage of the rural sector and the terms of trade between the sectors adjust until all the rural 
workers are employed and the full employment production level is reached. In other words, 
given  , we get   by (6).  With  and (1), we obtain the full employment production of the 
rural sector,  .  The sector production levels determine the terms of trade p through equation 
(5). Finally, the real wage of the rural sector in terms of the manufactured good, 
u n a n a n
a x
a ω , is 
obtained by (3), given   and p.  In short, the vector   configures a  
temporary equilibrium or a short run, which is defined for a given vector of exogenous 
variables
a n ) , , , , , (
* *
m a m a a x x n n p ω
6 and a given urban population of workers  .  This temporary equilibrium will be 
disturbed when a redistribution of the population of workers between sectors happens, i.e., 
when there is a migration of workers that changes the urban population. 
u n
Harris and Todaro, for determining the long run equilibrium, argue that the rural workers 
reckon, in their decision on migrating to the urban area, the expected wage,  , defined as: 
e
u ω







= .                                          (7) 
  The key assumption of the model of Harris and Todaro is that there will be a migratory 
flow from the rural to the urban sector while the expected urban real wage is higher than in 
the rural sector. Thus, the long run equilibrium, i.e., the absence of a rural-urban migratory 
flow is established when the urban worker population reaches a level such that the expected 
urban real wage equates the rural real wage, i.e.: 
   .                                (8)  a
e
u ω ω =
This equality is known in the literature as the Harris-Todaro condition.  
  The level of the urban population that satisfies the Harris-Todaro condition,  , is 
attained from the solution of the equation resulting from substitution of equations (3), (5), (6), 
and (7) in (8): 
*
u n
  ( ) ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * * * * = − − ′ − u m u m u m n g x n g n n ρ ω .               (8-a) 
Figure 1 illustrates this solution. Note that the position of curve labeled 
( ) ) 1 ( ) 1 (
*
u m u a n g x n g − − ′ = ρ ω  also depends on the minimum wage, since the relative price, 
                                                 
6 The endowment of land, the stocks of capital and the minimum wage. 
 3p, depends upon the urban production,  . Combined with the diagram that represents the 
manufacturing demand curve for labor, we can also see urban unemployment, given by the 
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Given the properties assumed for the functions  ) (⋅ g  and  ) (⋅ ρ , existence and uniqueness of 
Harris-Todaro equilibrium with urban unemployment are guaranteed if 







] 1 ( 1 lim > −
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              ( 9 )  
and 
  m m m n g g ω ρ − ′ 1 ( ) 1 (
* * .                        (10) 
By condition (9), as the numbers of rural workers tend to zero, both the labor productivity in 
this sector and the terms of trade tend to extreme high values. Thus the rural real wage 
becomes greater than the expected urban real wage. On its part, condition (10) establishes 
that, at the value for which the minimum wage restriction is binding, the real rural wage must 
be smaller than the expected urban real wage, which in the present case equals the 
exogenously determined minimum wage.  
Harris and Todaro (1970, p. 129), in order to evaluate the long run equilibrium, postulate 
a mechanism of adjustment that is based on the following function of sign preservation: 
   ,    with  )
e
u u n ω − =   0 ) >  and  0 ) 0 ( = ψ .                    (11) 
Thus, while  ,   will be the result, and only if  ,   will occur. The 
differential equation that governs the state transition in the model of Harris and Todaro is 
obtained by substituting the left-hand side of (8-a) in (11): 
e
u ω > u n   a
e
u ω ω = 0 = u n  
   ) ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( (
* *
u m m m u n g x g n n − ′ − = ρ ω   .                    (12) 






Based on this postulated adjustment process, Harris and Todaro (1970, p. 138-139) show 
that the long run equilibrium is globally stable.
8 This means that the economy of Harris and 
Todaro would tend to long run equilibrium with unemployment in the urban sector generated 




                                                
7 Considering (10) in  , this results in   . Given condition (9) and the fact that  u n = 0 > u n  
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 43. Migration of workers as a replicator dynamics in a milieu of bounded rationality 
 
We begin our analysis by going back to the situation used by Harris and Todaro in their 
analysis of the rural-urban migratory process. We assume that, between consecutive periods 
of production, each worker decides to which sector he will supply his labor force. We 
exclude, by assumption, the possibility that a worker may simultaneously supply his labor 
force to both sectors. Hence, only two strategies are admitted for the worker: stay in the sector 
in which he was (employed or not) during the previous production period or migrate to the 
other sector.  
As in the Harris and Todaro model, we will assume that the population of workers is kept 
constant and equal to n , normalized to unity. In a given moment, there are, in population 
units,   workers in the urban sector and  u n u r n n − =1
v
, in the rural sector. A fraction   of 
workers from the urban sector is employed and 
u v
u − 1 , unemployed. Thus there are   
employed workers in the urban sector, with 
u v u n
) 1 ( u u v n −  unemployed.  Contrarily to Harris and 
Todaro, we assume the possibility of rural unemployment. Consequently, we may beforehand 
have a fraction   of rural workers employed, with the remaining rural workers unemployed. 
In units of population,   workers from the rural sector are employed and 
r v
r rv n ) r 1 ( r n v − , 
unemployed. 
Given that  , it is enough to consider the evolution of one of these state 
variables. We choose the number of workers of the urban sector. The change in the urban 
sector population, for an infinitesimal time interval, is given by the difference between the 
estimated quantity of immigrant workers to the urban sector and the estimated quantity of 
emigrant workers from this sector to the rural sector: 
1 = + r u n n
u n   = urban sector inflow - urban sector outflow                    (13) 
If a worker from a given sector compares his income with another worker from the same 
sector, he does not get information on the other market and thus he has no basis for evaluating 
his choice of strategy.  In such a situation, we assume that the worker will not change his 
strategy. Comparison of income among workers from different markets will be taken as a 
necessary condition, even though not sufficient, for a migration to ensue. 
In Table 1, we list the possibilities of comparisons of possible incomes in the economy. 
Event 1 stands for the following case: an employed worker in the rural sector and an 
employed worker in the urban sector measure up their incomes.  Since in a given moment 
there are   workers employed in the rural sector and n  workers employed in the 
urban sector, measured in population units, then the estimated number of employed rural 
workers that will compare their incomes with the incomes of employed urban workers is 
. The other events shown in Table 1 may be analogously interpreted. 
r u v n ) 1 ( −
u uv n
u uv





3.1. Rural-urban migratory flow 
 
  The comparison on the part of a rural worker of his income with the income of an urban 
sector worker is only a necessary condition for him to change his strategy. Another necessary 
condition for change of strategy is that the real income in the urban sector (  be greater  ) u y
 5than the real income in the rural sector  . In a word, a rural worker is a potential 
immigrant to the urban sector whenever the comparison of incomes yields  . 
) ( r y
r u y y >
( − − r ε ω
{ ( ) ω −
( r ω −
− + u u ε ω
u ε − +
{ u ε −
 We suppose that, satisfied the necessary conditions put above, effecting a strategy change 
will depend upon the difference between incomes of workers in rural e urban sectors. The 
higher is this difference in income the higher is the incentive for the rural worker to look for a 
new job in the urban sector.  Put differently, if  0 > − r u y y , the proportion of workers of the 
rural sector that will actually migrate is assumed to be directly proportional to the difference 
in income  . r u y y −
9   
In Table 1, we summarize the income gaps that may appear in each possible comparison. 
The income of workers of the i
th sector was separated in two components: one is the real wage 
i ω  (null when the worker is unemployed) and the other, the sum of incomes unconnected to 
the direct sale of his labor force,  i ε , assumed exogenous and hereafter named non-wage 
income.
10  
From Table 1, we can estimate the migratory flow of workers to the urban sector. When 
employed rural workers relate their income to the one of the employed urban workers (event 
1) and  0 ) ( ) ( ≤ − − + = − r r u u r u y y ε ω ε ω , then the quantity of immigrant rural workers will 
be zero. However, when this comparison yields  0 ) ) ( > + = − r u u r u y y ε ω , the 
estimated inflow of employed workers in the urban sector is directly proportional to this 
differential in income (normalized). In a compact way, the subsequent expression gives both 
possibilities: 
   0 ), ( max ) 1 ( r r u u u u r u v n v n ε ε ω + + − .                              (14)  }
When employed rural workers compare their income with unemployed urban workers 
(event 2), there will be immigration to the urban sector provided the non-wage income at the 
urban sector is high enough as weighed against the expected total income in the rural sector: 
   { } 0 ), max ) 1 ( ) 1 ( r u u u r u v n v n ε ε + − − .                     (15) 
The same type of comparison is valid for events 3 and 4. Provided  0 > r ε , the 
proportion of rural workers that effectively immigrate is directly proportional to this income 
difference: 
   { } 0 , max ) 1 )( 1 ( r u u u r u v n v n ε ω − − .                      (16) 
Likewise, an encounter of unemployed rural workers with unemployed urban workers, 
combined with appropriate differential in incomes will result in an inflow of workers to the 
urban sector given by 
   } 0 , max ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( r u u r u v n v n ε − − − .                      (17) 
                                                 
9 In the theory of evolutionary games, this assumption may have several microeconomic foundations. See the 
appendix to this paper. 
10  The non-wage income may be generalized to include net benefits of the public budget plus other usual sources 
of income that are studied in the literature on migration. Thus, even under unemployment in both areas, it may 
be worth the effort to migrate to the urban sector. 
 6By aggregating expressions (14), (15), 16) and (17), we get the expected migratory flow 
from the rural to the urban sector: 
     [
].   } 0 , max{ ) 1 )( 1 ( } 0 , max{ ) 1 (                   
} 0 ), ( max{ ) 1 ( } 0 ), ( max{ ) 1 (
r u u r r u u u r
r r u u r r r u u u r u u
v v v v
v v v v n n
ε ε ε ε ω
ε ω ε ε ω ε ω
− − − + − + − +
+ − − + + − + −
                (18) 
3.2. Urban-rural migratory flow 
 
A worker from the urban sector becomes a potential emigrant only if he compares his 
income with the income of a worker from the rural sector and discovers that 
u u u r r r y y = + > + = ε ω ε ω . As before, four events are possible in this pairwise comparison 
of incomes, according to the situation of employment of each worker in the urban and the 
rural sectors. 
Take, for example, event 1. As employed urban workers contrast their income with the 
income of their equals as to the employment situation in the rural area, two results are 
possible. If   0 ) ( ≥ + − + = − r r u u r u y y ε ω ε ω , no employed urban worker leaves his area. 
However, if  0 ) ( < + − + = − r r u u r u y y ε ω ε ω , the migratory outflow from the urban area 
will be directly proportional to this difference in income, or: 
   } 0 ), ( min{ ) 1 ( r r u u r u u u v n v n ε ω ε ω + − + − − .                    (19) 
The other three events are interpretable likewise. Thus, from event 3, the result of the 
meeting of an employed urban worker with unemployed rural workers may be described by: 
   } 0 , min{ ) 1 )( 1 ( r u u r u u u v n v n ε ε ω − + − − −                      (20) 
Event 2, when unemployed urban workers come across employed workers from the rural 
sector, results in: 
  } 0 ), ( min{ ) 1 )( 1 ( r r u r u u u v n v n ε ω ε + − − − − .                    (21) 
At last, in event 4, unemployed workers from both areas meet and the corresponding expected 
migration is given by: 
  } 0 , min{ ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( r u r u u u v n v n ε ε − − − − −                       (22) 
By aggregating expressions  (19) to (22), we attain the expected migratory outflow from 
the urban to the rural sector: 
[
]. } 0 , min{ ) 1 )( 1 ( } 0 ), ( min{ ) 1 (                   
} 0 , min{ ) 1 ( } 0 ), ( min{ ) 1 (
r u r u r r u r u
r u u r u r r u u r u u u
v v v v
v v v v n n
ε ε ε ω ε
ε ε ω ε ω ε ω
− − − + + − − +
− + − + + − + − −
              (23) 
 73.3. Replicator dynamics 
 
Given these possibilities of migration for the workers, the change in the proportion of 
workers located in the urban sector is approximated by the difference between the rural-urban 
flow and the urban-rural flow, i.e., by the difference between (18) and (23): 
     
[
].   } 0 , min{ ) 1 )( 1 ( } 0 ), ( min{ ) 1 (                            
} 0 , min{ ) 1 ( } 0 ), ( min{                            
} 0 , max{ ) 1 )( 1 ( } 0 , max{ ) 1 (                            
} 0 ), ( max{ ) 1 ( } 0 ), ( max{ ) 1 (
r u u r r r u r u
r u u r u r r u u r u
r u u r r u u u r
r r u u r r r u u u r u u u
v v v v
v v v v
v v v v
v v v v n n n
ε ε ε ω ε
ε ε ω ε ω ε ω
ε ε ε ε ω
ε ω ε ε ω ε ω
− − − + + − − +
− + − + + − + +
− − − + − + − +
+ − − + + − + − =  
      (24) 
Given that  d d d = + } 0 , min{ } 0 , max{  for any real constant d, the equation (24) may be 
simplified to: 
   )] ( ) )[( 1 ( r r r u u u u u u v v n n n ε ω ε ω + − + − =   .                      (24-a) 
This replicator dynamics formally mirrors the intuition that the urban labor force 
proportion increases, stays put, or lowers while the average income in this market 
) ( u u u v ε ω + is, respectively, higher, equal, or lower than in the rural sector  ) ( r r r v ε ω + .   
Optionally, by simple algebraic handling, we get the replicator dynamics (24-a): 
   )]} )( 1 ( ) ( [ ) {( r r r u u u u u u u u u u v n v n v n n ε ω ε ω ε ω + − + + − + =   .                 (24-a) 
The expression within brackets is the average real income of the economic system as a whole. 
Consequently, the supply of labor to the urban sector tends to expand if and only if the 
expected income in this market is superior to the average real income of the economy. 
 
 
4. The Harris-Todaro condition as a resultant property of an evolutionary game 
 
We have seen in section 2 that the Harris-Todaro model assumes that prices in the rural 
sector are perfectly flexible, which implies full employment there. This means that  1 ) ( = t vr  
for all  , with   an arbitrary initial point in time. Moreover, in the urban sector, for a 
minimum wage, the employment level is n . As a result, the probability that a worker 
finds a job in the urban sector is inversely related to the size of the population in this sector, 
i.e.,  . Given that in the Harris and Todaro model non-wage income 




u m n ≤
*
u u n v ) 0 ( = = r u ε ε  
are not taken into account, we have that  m u u y ω ω = =  and  a r y ω = . Given these 
assumptions, the replicator dynamics, as expressed by (24-a), becomes: 






− − = a m
u
m
u u u n
n
n n n ω ω
*
) 1 (   .                        (25) 
   The  Harris-Todaro  condition,  as  given  by (8), is an equilibrium condition in the 
replicator dynamics of (25). Therefore, the size of the urban population at the long run 
 8equilibrium of Harris and Todaro,  , is also an equilibrium value from equation of (25). This 
equilibrium, from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory, is an equilibrium of mixed 
strategy, since rural workers keep moving to the urban sector and vice-versa, although the 
respective sizes of the urban and rural populations are stable. What happens in this kind of 
equilibrium is that there is equality between the flow of rural workers that migrate to the 
urban sector and the flow of urban workers that migrate to the rural sector. In other words, in 
this mixed strategy equilibrium there is a macroequilibrium generated by intersector migration 
flows that counterbalance each other. 
*
u n
Worth pointing out is the fact that the replicator dynamics (25), by itself replaces the 
postulated mechanism of adjustment of Harris and Todaro, which is based on a sign 
preserving function, i.e., the replicator dynamics substitutes the differential equation (11). 
Said differently, the mechanism of labor allocation of Harris and Todaro comes out from the 
interaction of heterogeneous agents in a milieu of bounded rationality. 
Now we have just to study the replicator dynamics of (25). Substituting the left-hand side 
of (8-a) into (25), we get: 
   )] ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( )[ 1 (
* *
u m u u m m u u u n g x n g n n n n n − − ′ − − = ρ ω                            (25-a) 
Given that   for  , the behavior of the state variable n  depends 
on the bracketed expression, i.e., on the expected wage differential. Since  , 
0 ) 1 ( > − u u n n 1
* < ≤ u m n n u
0 ) ( > ⋅ g 0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ ′ g , 
0 ) ( > ⋅ ρ , and  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ ρ  for  , the impact of a variation in urban population on the 
expected wage differential is given by: 
1 < u n
* ≤ m n
     [] 0
) (
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ρ ω ,      (26) 
for  . Thus in this interval we have that:  1




< ⇒ < ⋅ ⋅ ′ − ⇒ < <
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u u m m u u
u u m m u u m
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          (27) 
Thus we deduce that for any initial condition   the economic system 
converges to the Harris-Todaro mixed strategy equilibrium  . If the urban population is 
below this equilibrium, i.e.,  , then the urban employment rate is too high, the 
marginal productivity of rural labor is too low and the terms of trade are biased towards 
manufactured goods. This situation gives rise to an average real wage in the urban sector 
greater than the real wage in the rural sector. Such a favorable income differential for the 
urban sector generates a positive net rural-urban migratory flow. This keeps going until its 
negative effect on the rate of urban employment and its positive effect on the marginal 
productivity of rural labor and on the terms of trade equalize average real wage between the 
two sectors. On the contrary, when the urban population is above the level of the Harris-
Todaro mixed strategy equilibrium,  , the urban employment rate is too low, the 
marginal productivity is too high and the terms of trade are biased towards agricultural goods. 
Now the average real wage in the urban sector is lower than the real wage in the rural sector. 
This leads to a reversal in rural-urban migration, constraining the migratory movement and 
ℜ ∈ ∈ ) 1 , [ ) (
*




u u m n n n < ≤
* < u n 1 < u n
 9taking the system back to the mixed strategy equilibrium. To put in a nutshell, the Harris-
Todaro condition emerges as the outcome of the interaction among heterogeneous workers 





In this paper, we developed an evolutionary game model, more specifically a replicator 
dynamics, which formalizes the sector allocation of labor as a process of imitation/learning in 
a milieu of bounded rationality. The Harris-Todaro condition comes out as a spontaneous 
upshot of interaction among heterogeneous workers. 
In the model we propose here, due to the separation of income in two parts – wage and 
non-wage income – there is room for studying the role of public policies that influence the 
non-wage component of income and therefore influence the migratory dynamics of Harris and 
Todaro. Analyzing this dynamics is directly relevant to a better understanding of the process 





An alternative derivation of the replicator dynamics of (22-a): 
The evolutionary game models based on an imitation process are formed by two essential 
pieces as highlighted by Weibull (1995, p. 152): "the time rate at which agents review their 
strategy choice" and "the choice probabilities of a reviewing agent."  Let   be the proportion 
of individuals from the population that opt for the strategy s
i x
r xi
i (type i agents), among h possible 
strategies and   be the distribution of strategies in the population. The 
(average) rate of revision of a type i agent refers to the average number of times this agent 
revises his strategy per time interval, and may be taken as function of the state of the 
population,  . This rate of revision may be considered as an arrival rate of a Poisson 
process, i.e., a realization of Poisson process.  Let us assume that the frequency with which an 
agent reconsiders his strategy in a given time interval does not affect the frequency of 
revisions of the other agents, which is the same as saying that the Poisson process of 
individual revisions are statistically independent. We then conclude that the aggregate rate of 
revision of the subpopulation given by type i agents is by itself a Poisson process with an 
average rate of revision  . If changes in individual strategies are statistically 
independent random variables, then the flow of agents from the type i subpopulation to the 
type j subpopulation is an aggregate Poisson process with the arrival rate  , where 
 is the probability of a type i agent becoming a type j. The choice probabilities of a type 
i agent form a probability distribution, represented by 
) , , , , , ( 2 1 h i x x x x x … … =
) (x
) (x r x i i
ri
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i i i = ),..., (x p
j
i ),..., , 








In the case of only two possible strategies,  2 = h , we have  1 2 1 = + x x
x
. Thus we need to 
consider only one state variable. Without loss of generality, we will take   as the reference 
state variable, so the vector of distribution of strategies will be perfectly determined once   
is given, because 
1
1 x
) 1 , ( ) , ( 1 1 2 1 x x x x x − = = . The inflow to the subpopulation of type i agents 
can be approximated by 





2 2 2 x p x r x
and the outflow by 
   .                                       (29)  ( ) (
2
1 1 1 x p x r x
The rate of variation of subpopulation 1 will be determined by the difference between 
inflow and outflow: 




2 2 2 1 x p x r x x p x r x x − =  
As explained by Weibull (1995, sect. 4), there are several assumptions pertaining to the 
revision rate and to the probability of choice that may be adopted. In section 3 above, we 
implicitly assumed that all reviewing agents reassess their choice together and just once per 
time interval, or  
                               (31)  1 ) ( ) ( 2 1 = = x r x r
As in section 3, we assume a direct imitation process (Weibull, 1995, p. 155-158), i.e., 
each reviewing agent randomly meets another agent so that the probability of a reviewing 
agent encountering an agent that follows strategy s  is   and one that follows   is 
. As done by Weibull (1995, p. 155-158), we suppose that, after the reviewing 
agent meets another agent, he detects, with some noise, his own payoff, 
1 1 x 2 s
1 2 1 x x − =
11  i i x α π + ) ( , and the 
payoff linked to the strategy of the other agent,  j j x α π + ) ( . Since  i α  and  j α  are stochastic 
variables, the difference  j i α α −  is also a stochastic variable, whose cumulative distribution 
function   is assumed to be continuously differentiable.  ] 1 , 0 [ : → R F
The type i reviewing agent becomes a type j agent if and only if the observed result of the 
latter overcomes the observed result of the former, i.e.,  i i j j x x α π α π + > + ) ( ) (,  o r  
equivalently, ) ( ) ( x x i j j i π π α α − < − . The probability that this happens is given by the 
image of the cumulative distribution function at the point  ) ( ) ( x x i j π π − , that is, 
( ) ) x ( ) (x F i j π π − . This function may be interpreted in other manners. Weibull (1995, p. 157), 
for example, gives an alternative rendition to the variables  i α  and  j α . They may be seen as 
idiosyncratic differences between preferences of the agents. As a result,  i i x α π + ) ( and 
j j x α π + ) (  become the true payoffs from strategies   and  , and the choice probabilities 
become the result from the differences between the strategies of agents, instead of individual 
observational errors by agents with similar preferences. Nachbar (1990) gives an alternative 
interpretation to function  , in which it reflects a change cost, c, not given in a 
deterministic form and instantly paid. In fact, 




 is assumed as a cumulative distribution 
function that furnishes the probability that  ) (x c i π π − ≤ . Hence, when a type i reviewing 
agent compares his payoff with a type j, he only changes his strategy if the cost of changing is 
lower or equal to the difference between the payoffs. In short, these authors include 
                                                 
11  ) (x i π  is the expected result for an agent that opts for a strategy si when the population state is 
.  ) 1 , ( ) 1 1 x x x − = , ( 2 1 x x =
 11observational errors, distinctions in preferences, or stochastic adjustment costs in order to give 
a microeconomic foundation to the imitation-based selection dynamics. 
Summarizing, the probability that an agent of type i meets an agent of type j is  , and the 
probability that a type i agent, given that he has met a type j, choose a strategy  , is 
j x
j s
( ) ) ( ) ( x x F i j π π − . Assuming that these two events are statistically independent, then the 
probability distribution function for the choice of a type i agent may be so expressed: 




i i π π π π − − − = = ,           (32) 
 for  i j ≠  and i . Substituting (31) and (32) into (30), we get:  2 , 1 , = j
   () ( ) [] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 x x F x x F x x x π π π π − − − − =   .                  (33) 
Now suppose that the stochastic variable  j i α α −  be uniformly distributed, i.e., that its 
probability density function be: 


 ≤ − ≤ −
= −
elsewhere         , 0







α α ,                      (34) 
with support [ , in which  ] ,a a − { }
2
2 1   ,   ) ( ) (   max ∆ ∈ ∀ − = x x x π π a , with  0 > β  being a real 







)] ( ) ( [




π π  ,  with  i j ≠ .                            (35) 
Inserting (35) into (33), we attain: 
   )] ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ) / 1 ( 2 1 1 1 1 x x x x a x π π − − =   .                          (36) 
In the replicator dynamics (24-a), from section 3, we have that   and 
, thus the type 1 agent is the urban worker and the type 2 agent is the rural 
worker. The expected payoff of a type 1 agent (urban worker) becomes: 
u n x = 1
u r n n x − = = 1 2
u u u v x ε ω π + = ) ( 1 ,                            (37) 
and the respective expected payoff of a rural worker turns into: 
   r r r v x ε ω π + = ) ( 2 .                            (38) 
For this reason, by considering  (37) and (38), the replicator dynamics may be written as: 
   )] ( ) )[( 1 ( ) / 1 ( r r r u u u u u u v v n n a n ε ω ε ω + − + − =   ,         (39) 
in which 
{ } { } ℜ ∈ ∈ ∀ + − + = ∆ ∈ ∀ − = ) 1 , 0 (   ,   ) (   max   ,   ) ( ) (   max
2
2 1 u r r r u u u n v v x x x a ε ω ε ω π π . 
 12Equation (39) is the replicator dynamics (24-a), except for the scalar 1/a, which does not alter 
the qualitative structure of the solutions of the replicator dynamics under inquiry. As a result, 
(24-a) may be interpreted as a normalized version of (38). Normalizing  , we can say that 
the income difference in (24-a) may now be expressed in units of the maximum differential in 
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Table 1 – Differential of income and number of estimated comparisons between workers of 
urban and rural sectors, according to employment situation  
Event
12 3 4
Situation Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed
Income
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                                Figure 1 – Harris-Todaro model with endogenous terms of trade 
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